Court Orders obtained “Ex-Parte” represent a decision of a judge made without the presence of all parties to the controversy.  When a Plaintiff, the person initiating the lawsuit, files the lawsuit, that spouse (or usually their attorney) can approach a judge and ask the judge to enter “Ex-Parte” orders. Common “Ex-Parte” orders include orders regarding the custody of a minor child, injunctions, sequestration orders, and restraining orders.

If the Plaintiff makes allegations that a minor child is exposed to a substantial risk of bodily injury or sexual abuse or that there is a substantial risk that the child may be abducted or removed from the State of North Carolina for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of North Carolina, the Court can enter an Ex-Parte Order on Child Custody that changes the normal living arrangements of the minor child.

Injunctions are often entered Ex-Parte to prevent the sale, destruction or waste of marital property. Sequestration orders may be entered Ex-Parte to grant an exclusive right of use of a former marital residence to one spouse to the exclusion of another.  Restraining orders may be entered Ex-Parte when there are allegations of regarding specific assets and debts and the use thereof or allegations of domestic violence.

Normally, an attorney’s obligation is solely to their client and only presents their client’s side at a hearing. In an “Ex-Parte” proceeding, however, an attorney’s ethical obligations require the attorney to inform the judge of all material facts known to the lawyer to enable the judge to make an informed decision whether or not the facts are adverse.

After the entry of any “Ex-Parte” order in a family law case in North Carolina, a hearing must generally be held within ten days to allow both parties to present facts and allow the judge to determine whether the order issued “Ex-Parte” should remain in full force and effect, be vacated or modified.

The term “Ex-Parte” is also used to refer to improper contacts with a Judge without notice to the other party or counsel for that party — usually those that occur after the filing of the initial lawsuit.  Once a lawsuit has already been filed, a party and their attorney cannot generally have “Ex-Parte” communications with a judge with some exceptions.

An example of an improper “Ex-Parte” communication made national news in 2009 when a North Carolina judge and an attorney communicated by Facebook regarding an on-going child custody case.   Judge Terry of Iredell County was reprimanded by the NC Judicial Standards Commission for the contact via Facebook.  To prevent the appearance of impropriety, some states (e.g., Florida, Oklahoma) have banned it and others have issued ethical opinions regarding it.

But “Ex-Parte” does not have to be over Facebook, it can be any communication where one party or their lawyer speaks with the judge without the presence of the other side.

While “Ex-Parte” is sometimes appropriate and ethical — especially at the outset of a lawsuit to obtain needed orders, it brings significant risks for the attorneys and the judge.

If you and your child(ren)’s parent(s) are no longer together consider doing some of the following on Mother’s Day:

And now it is nearly always included in child custody orders honoring mom as a day that mom gets to enjoy with her child(ren) regardless of where the child(ren) normally lives.   Many child custody court orders will include language such as the following:

Mother’s Day (2nd Sunday in May)

Even if a period of Secondary Custody falls on or includes Mother’s Day, the children shall be returned by their father to the custody of their mother at 5:00 p.m., on the Saturday before Mother’s Day and the children shall remain in mother’s physical custody until they return to school on the Monday following Mother’s Day.

 So it is critical that child(ren) spend time with their mother on mother’s day unless prohibited by a court order.

There are very rare instances when a mother does not enjoy mother’s day with her child(ren).  Woe unto a father who prevents a mother from spending time with her children in violation of a court order which grants her Mother’s Day.  Most judges are likely to punish the father under these circumstances with contempt of court unless they have a compelling  justifiable reason for failing to comply with the custody order.

The law on relocation differs depending on whether a child’s custody has been litigated, and whether a child’s custody is addressed in a Separation Agreement. If the parties have not litigated issues related to their child and do not have a Separation Agreement, it is possible to relocate immediately inside or outside of North Carolina prior to litigating custody and/or child support. If the new location is in another state, consult an attorney in that state for advice on how much time you must reside there before filing a custody action. Generally, a person is also allowed to take their child and move immediately to a new location if domestic violence is involved.

If parents have litigated custody or have a Separation Agreement, and relocation is not agreed to by both parents, an attorney will likely file a Motion to Modify Visitation or Custody. There are several recent North Carolina cases involving these motions, essentially requesting the court’s permission to relocate. The parties in these North Carolina cases had different reasons for requesting that the court grant their motions, but a similar test was applied by the courts in the cases. The courts considered the child’s best interests to determine whether to modify custody or visitation. A court might also refuse to modify a prior Order unless a substantial change of circumstances has occurred; however, a move for employment reasons is likely a substantial change of circumstances. Based upon these cases, a court will likely use several factors to determine the child’s best interests. These factors include:

…the advantages of the relocation in terms of its capacity to improve the life of the child; the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the move; the likelihood that the custodial parent will comply with visitation orders when he or she is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of North Carolina; the integrity of the noncustodial parent in resisting the relocation; and the likelihood that a realistic visitation schedule can be arranged which will preserve and foster the parental relationship with the noncustodial parent.

—Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C.App. 135, 142, 530 S.E.2d 576, 580 (2000).

If a North Carolina trial court uses these factors to determine the child’s best interests its decision is more likely to be upheld on appeal.

A court also has the discretion to reduce child support payments in a case involving relocation. If a court allows relocation of a parent and child, that court will have possibly held that a substantial change of circumstances occurred. As a result, that court may not only modify custody, the court may also modify child support. A court can increase or decrease child support, and a court can deviate from the North Carolina child support guidelines. For instance, a court might suspend a parent’s child support obligation so that the non custodial parent can visit the child in the new location.

Preparation is important when attempting to relocate. It is wise to first consult the other biological parent, and to memorialize any agreement in writing, at which time an attorney can draft a consent order or modification of a Separation Agreement as appropriate. If no agreement is reached, consult an attorney to prepare a Motion to Modify Visitation or similar action, and also consider child support. In all cases, your ability to relocate will depend on what is in the best interests of your child.

In child custody cases, judges are required to consider the best interests of minor children and their safety. Allegations of substance abuse — of any nature including but not limited to abuse of alcohol, illegal drugs, prescription drugs, etc. — must be taken seriously. When allegations of substance abuse appear to be supported by evidence, the Court will often order drug testing to verify whether substance abuse is a problem. In making the determination whether to order drug testing, the judge will consider the credibility of the testimony, whether the party admits to substance abuse, past history including criminal charges for drug use, other evidence and risk/danger to the child. Since inaccurate accusations are common, some judges are reluctant to order testing based upon a mere accusation of substance use/abuse. Outside corroboration is often best obtained through affidavits of eye-witnesses of through the use of a private investigator.  Private investigators like Cape Fear Investigative Services can perform trash pulls and look for evidence of drugs and even swipe door handles to test for drug residue.

Nationally, about 21.2% of adults age 18–25 use illicit drugs according to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.  Of adults 26 years of age or older, about 6.3% use illicit drugs but nearly 20% of adults age 26–34 report binge drinking. Rates of marijuana use in nearly every age group is on the rise. Statistically, males are more likely to be drug users than females and drug use is also higher among those unemployed. See the complete 2009 results.

A judge can order the cost of drug testing be paid by either party and is in the discretion of the Court. The type of drug testing is also in the discretion of the court. A urine screen is quick and relatively inexpensive but is easily subject to manipulation of results (e.g., drinking large amounts of water in advance of the test) and the look back period is very limited often to less than one week. A hair follicle test is more expensive but often provides much better results over a longer period of time. And a test of a fingernail is even better for some purposes.  We often use ARCpoint in Wilmington, NC for drug testing results.

When a party has a problem with drugs, the best approach is to get a substance abuse assessment and follow the treatment recommendations — even in-patient treatment if needed. By showing a pattern of recovery, the party is best able to convince the Court that the problem is admitted, is being addressed and that management of the problem is on-going.

Mental health experts can also perform a substance abuse assessment and often use the Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (SASSI) as one mechanism to help identify individuals with a high probability of having a substance dependence disorder.

When dealing with accusations of substance abuse in a child custody case, it is important to have legal counsel and a plan of action in place to refute false accusations or embrace true accusations and put a safety plan in place that allows the parties to have quality time with their children.

The rationale for this varies. Some mothers say they are uncomfortable at schools and social events. Others claim the children are embarrassed or the name is inconvenient and creates confusion for third parties.

In some states, a mother who has remarried may informally change a child’s surname to the step-dad’s name, regardless of whether the biological dad pays child support and exercises his visitation rights. Patricia Cook, What’s in a Name? The National Father’s Resource Center (2005) at fathers4kids.org.

Some states recognize that when there is a divorce and the mother is given custody of the children, the bond between the father and his children may be weakened if the children’s surname was to be changed. Therefore, some states do not allow a change of name against the father’s objection, merely to save the mother and child inconvenience or embarrassment. Robinson v. Hansel, 223 N.W.2d 138 (Minn. 1974). Other states will allow the name change if it is in the best interests of the minor children. See In re Application of Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 300-01 (Minn. 1981); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 166 (Minn. App. 2000); Gleason v. Michlitsch, 728 P2d 965 (Or. App. 1986); Flowers v. Cain, 237 S.E.2d 111 (Va. 1977); Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz.App. 58 (1975).

But this is absolutely not the case in North Carolina. The only way a child’s name can be changed in North Carolina is if both parents agree. In the Matter of the Change of Name of Crawford, 134 N.C.App. 137, 517 S.E.2d 161 (1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 101-2(d). It does not matter if it is in the best interests of the child. It does not matter if it leads to confusion or embarrassment or anything else. If one parent says no, the only way the name can be changed is by the child once that child reaches the age of eighteen.

And if the parent attempts to informally change the name in North Carolina, that might be viewed as parental alienation and a violation of the child custody order which may be punishable by contempt including jail time.

As one might have guessed Eunice H. Chapman did not have the same legal standing and property rights as women have in modern society.  When Eunice married James Chapman she lost her property rights and legal standing as an individual. As a result, when her husband attempted to reconcile only to be rebuffed by Eunice, her husband took the remaining property and their three children to the Shaker religious group. 

It is worth pointing out that Eunice did not want to reconcile for a couple of reasons. First, James was notorious for drinking and wasteful spending, leading to him selling much of the couple’s property before abandoning his family. Second, James claimed to have changed and wanted to live in Shaker society in which the couple would not live together alone as Husband and Wife. Eunice was not interested in the type of life offered by Shaker society, and this refusal set off the battle between Eunice and the Shaker religious leaders of James’ group.

These events leading to Eunice’s extraordinary acheivement are very interesting. At first, Eunice maintained custody of her three children until her husband and the Shaker leaders lured Eunice away from her home and then removed her children and the remaining property from the home. For a couple of years Eunice attempted to settle custody with the Shaker leaders, without success.  Eunice was determined to get her divorce and custody so she sought the assistance of the New York legislature. Around 1817, after years of talking in person and writing to the NY assemblymen, Eunice was given a “legislative divorce” from her husband, and no actual trial occurred. Even Thomas Jefferson noticed and commented on Eunice’s case. 

Eunice may have received her divorce, but she did not have custody of her children yet. She reportedly resorted to gathering a mob to go to the Shaker group that had possession of her three children. Again, Eunice remarkably overcame the religious leaders by getting her three children back.

New York law later changed around 1966 so that a divorce was not solely dependent on proving adultery.  In the majority of states the law is either based on a “no fault divorce”, or the divorce law is dependant on a period of separation, as in North Carolina.  However, religion does still play a role in some custody disputes. (For more information see Richard Kern’s Article: Custody and Religion). 

The current news is full of interesting court cases about marital rights, multiple marriages, and interstate custody battles, but Eunice H. Chapman’s remarkable legal battle is truly noteworthy. Litigants in 2010 are understandably frustrated by the amount of time required to get a divorce, but their divorce and custody matters usually only last one to two years. In light of the many years spent in pursuit of Eunice H. Chapman’s legislative divorce the modern legal system has come a long way.

An adoption tax credit for qualified adoption expenses is available to middle income families pursuant to Section 23 of the United States Internal Revenue Code. The adoption tax credit encourages adoption by helping families afford the attorney fees, court costs, and other expenses associated with adoptions and is now more accessible due to new legislation contained in the Health Care and Education Reconcilliation Act of 2010. The Credit does not apply to Stepparent adoptions. Besides the Credit, if your employer paid qualifying adoption expenses, they may be excludable from your gross income.

For purposes of this topic it is best to first differentiate the different types of adoption which could be applicable in a particular matter: 1) The Domestic adoption, an adoption within the U.S.; 2) International adoption — where a child born outside the U.S. is brought into the U.S.to live with the adoptive parents; and 3) the adoption of a special needs child.

There is new legislation on the horizon. In both the Senate and the House of Representatives are Bills that could help promote adoption even further. Thereby promoting adoption for children so as to provide them with better lives and better future. H.R. 213: Adoption Tax Relief Guarantee Act of 2009.

In 2009, the tax credit for adoption was increased amounting to $12,150.00. Now H.R. 3590 includes a provision to extend the adoption tax credit until December 2011 and it has increased tax credit to $13,170.00 for adoptions made after January 2010 and has an adjustment for inflation in 2011. This bill also allows the tax credit to be refundable. However, pursuant to the middle income family tax relief purpose of the Adoption tax credit;If your AGI is more than $182,180.00 then the tax credit amount is phased out and if your AGI is more than $221,180.00 then you cannot claim the tax credit or the exclusion.

In order to qualify, a person seeking to claim the tax creditmust adopt a child and pay the applicable expenses of the adoption, these expenses may include many none qualifying expenses as well as qualifying expenses. Nonqualified expenses are those that violate state or federal law, expenses for carrying out any surrogate parenting arrangement, expenses for the adoption of a spouse’s child (hence, stepparent adoptions do not qualify for the adoption tax credit), expenses for which you have received funds under any federal, state or local program, expenses allowed as a credit or deduction under any other federal income tax rule, expenses paid or reimbursed by your employer or any other person or organization or those paid before 1997. Given the nature and accessiblilty of the adoption tax credit, adoptions become more affordable for middle income families and children in need of a home are now more likely to be adopted by a family. Adoption is a great option for those persons and couples seeking to start a family and who, by biology or gender, cannot produce a child of their own. There are many children in the Unites States and abroad who could use parents and no longer should the cost of adoption alone hinder good parents from adopting good children.

Author’s Note: The above is presented as general information. It is not exhaustive coverage of this issue but only a general explanation from a layperson’s percpective. The purpose of this article is to inform the non-lawyer who may read current status of the adoption tax credit. The reader interested in learning more should contact an attorney licensed to practice law in their jurisdiction, specifically tax law.

Generally, Joint legal custody means that the two parents consult and decide together what long-term decisions are in the best interest of their child. It is assumed in North Carolina that a fit parent makes decisions that are in their child’s best interest. In a sole custody situation, the parent enjoying sole custody has the authority to make such decisions. In North Carolina, a Court may delegate certain areas and topics regarding decision-making authority to a particular parent, even in the context of joint legal custody. However, according to some North Carolina case law, if a Court delegates all decision-making authority to a single parent, then North Carolina Courts will consider the parent with sole decision-making authority to be in sole custody of the child despite language in the child custody order purporting to convey joint legal custody. These concepts are important for parents to understand because in many joint custody arrangements disagreements arise as to what is in the child’s best interest with regard to their spiritual upbringing.

A North Carolina Court may inquire as to the religious practices of parents to determine the effect of certain religious practices with regard to the physical, mental, and spiritual health of a minor child and may use the information gained as a factor in determining which custody arrangement will best promote the best interests of a child so long as the inquiry is: a limited inquiry related to the impact that the practices of the religion have upon the child and/or the parents’ ability to promote attendance or instruction in a religion. This information may be used as one factor in determining the custody arrangement that serves the child’s best interest so long as the Court does not preference any particular faith or religious instruction in making their determination. Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 446 S.E.2d 17 (1994).

In Dean, the Court of Appeals stated the “trial court properly considered wife’s failure to take five-year-old child to church and Sunday school, and consideration of such fact did not violate constitutional provisions concerning separation of church and state.” Dean, 32 N.C.App. at 483.

In MacLagan, the North Carolina Court of Appeals went further by declaring proper the decision of the trial court that the father of a child have exclusive decision-making authority over his child’s religious upbringing. The Court of Appeals overcame the mother’s argument that the trial court had shown religious preference in allowing the father (who was Jewish) to be the sole decision-maker as to the child’s religious upbringing as opposed to the mother (who was Christian) by citing the undisputed facts in the trial Court’s record that: 1) the parties had agreed to raise the child in the Jewish faith before they separated; 2) the child was raised in Judaism since the age of three; 3) the child had substantial involvement in her father’s Synagogue; and 4) the child had increased stress and anxiety due to her being raised in two conflicting religions “which have had a detrimental effect on [the child’s] emotional well-being.” MacLagan, 123 N.C.App. at 569-570.

It is noteworthy that the cases cited above, in large part, contain dicta and language to suggest that the inquiry into religious practices may not be the sole determinative factor in either custody or in delineating certain areas of the decision-making authority with regard to spiritual well-being, most of the cases above point out specifically that the trial court did not rely solely on the inquiry into religious practices to make their determination.

Another interesting potential situation regarding this topic is what should a Court do when a child desires to make his/her own decisions regarding their own religious upbringing.

The Constitutional rights of children have been acknowledged by courts all over the United States in a growing number of cases over the last couple decades. Children have protected Constitutional rights with regard to: their religious beliefs, expression, privacy, procedural due process in criminal and civil matters, and even with respect to double jeopardy. However, most of the United States Supreme Court cases recognizing the Constitutional rights of children involves a conflict between a child and the State/government and does not relate to a child’s Constitutional rights in relation to the conflicting rights of a parent. It is likely that a child may not even have standing to contest their parent’s decisions with regard to religious upbringing in most foreseeable situations as the conflict would likely not have a basis in governmental action which would be a necessary element for any Constitutional challenge.

It is well-established that fit natural parents have a Constitutionally protected right to raise their child as they see proper, including but not limited to deciding with whom that child associates. Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the United States Supreme Court specifically avoided the question as to conflicting Constitutional protections as between Amish parents and their children when the Court stated:

Contrary to the suggestion of the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, our holding today in no degree depends on the assertion of the religious interest of the child as contrasted with that of the parents. It is the parents who are subject to prosecution here for failing to cause their children to attend school, and it [406 U.S. 205, 231] is their right of free exercise, not that of their children, that must determine Wisconsin’s power to impose criminal penalties on the parent. The dissent argues that a child who expresses a desire to attend public high school in conflict with the wishes of his parents should not be prevented from doing so. There is no reason for the Court to consider that point since it is not an issue in the case. The children are not parties to this litigation. The State has at no point tried this case on the theory that respondents were preventing their children from attending school against their expressed desires, and indeed the record is to the contrary. The State’s position from the outset has been that it is empowered to apply its compulsory-attendance law to Amish parents in the same manner as to other parents — that is, without regard to the wishes of the child. That is the claim we reject today.

Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible competing interests of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding in which the power of the State is asserted on the theory that Amish parents are preventing their minor children from attending high school despite their expressed desires to the contrary. Recognition of the claim of the State in such a proceeding would, of course, call into question traditional concepts of parental control over the religious up-bringing and education of their minor children recognized in this Court’s past decisions. It is clear that such an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of religious training would give rise to grave questions of religious freedom comparable to those raised here [406 U.S. 205, 232] and those presented in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). On this record we neither reach nor decide those issues.

In Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205, 230-231 (1972). However, Justice Douglas wrote in his dissent that that majority decision left the children under the yoke of the parents and that by not addressing the relationship between the constitutional rights of the parents and those of the children, the children’s constitutional rights were effectively abrogated by imposition of the parents religious views upon the children.

Under North Carolina law, the question of priority regarding a child’s Constitutional rights of free exercise of religion versus that of a parent seems unsettled as much as it is in the national context. The question is: at what point can a state enforce a child’s constitutional rights as against a parent’s right to raise their child?

In conclusion, North Carolina Courts may consider which parent is better suited to care for a child’s spiritual upbringing and may use this consideration as one factor in determining the custody arrangement that is in the best interests of the child. The Court may also order that one parent or the other have sole decision-making authority as to the child’s spiritual upbringing. However, it is unclear whether or to what degree courts may enforce a child’s wishes regarding their spiritual upbringing as against the decisions of their parents or parent.

Author’s Note: The above is presented as general information. It is not exhaustive coverage of this issue but only a general explanation from an attorney’s perspective. The purpose of this article is to inform the non-lawyer who may read current status of the issue in North Carolina. The reader interested in learning more should contact an attorney licensed to practice law in their jurisdiction.

In North Carolina, as in many states, the law is trying to keep up with changing technology and culture. This is not just true in so far as computers and cell phone usage is concerned, but also in health and medical fields. For instance, the law in North Carolina has recently recognized a changing world in recent passage of laws concerning: smoking in public places, driving while texting, and video conferencing over the Internet as a supplement to traditional child visitation. Another area of recent fluctuation in the laws of North Carolina is in the area surrogacy.

Surrogacy is the term used to describe the pregnancy of a woman for the benefit of another—usually a contracting couple. There are several types of surrogacy arrangements, such as: “straight” surrogacy when the surrogate is carrying to term her biological child which was conceived precisely for the purpose of providing a child to a contracting couple; “gestational” surrogacy involves the surrogate mother becoming pregnant by transferring a fertilized embryo into the surrogate mother to act as the host of the embryo baby until birth.

Either form of surrogacy, straight or gestational, may be either altruistic or commercial in nature. In altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate receives no compensation for carrying the child to term except as to medical and other pregnancy related expenses. In commercial surrogacy, where allowed, the surrogate receives compensation above and beyond the medical expenses, said compensation can range from $10,000 to around $55,000, not including the cost of fertilization procedures and other medical expenses.

Surrogacy is a viable option for those wishing to produce a child who do not have the means by which to do so, including infertile couples, homosexual and lesbian couples, and single persons wishing to have a child.

North Carolina does not presently have any law directly dealing with surrogacy. However, contract law and adoption laws in North Carolina appear to allow surrogacy albeit in strained terms.

North Carolina has recognized artificial insemination in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49A-1 which states: “Any child or children born as the result of heterologous artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife requesting and consenting in writing to the use of such technique.”

However, nowhere in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49A-1 is surrogacy mentioned.

Under North Carolina law, a delivering mother is presumed to be the mother of the child she delivers. The husband of the delivering mother is presumed to be the father of the child. Thus, if a woman agrees to be the surrogate mother for a contracting couple, then, upon birth of the child, the surrogate is considered the mother and her husband is presumed to be the father despite the fact that neither one may have contributed genetically to the child. This leaves the contracting couple (who may have both contributed to the genetic make-up of the child) forced to adopt their own biological child under North Carolina’s adoption statutes.

Adoption in this manner is allowed under North Carolina law so long as no compensation is paid to the surrogate—commercial surrogacy appears to not be allowed under North Carolina law where the adoptions statutes apply. It should be noted that the adoption procedures open the contracting party up to various pre-placement requirements enumerated in the adoption statutes including home studies by the Department of Social Services or another licensed agency.

In March 2009, the legislature of North Carolina began working on House Bill 510 and Senate Bill 440. If the proposed law passes, gestational surrogacy agreements would be officially recognized by North Carolina. As it stands, contract law generally allows parties to the contract to agree to almost any endeavor so long as the purpose of the contract is not immoral or illegal and does not violate public policy. It has not been established whether or not North Carolina would consider a surrogacy agreement immoral or in violation of public policy and as such surrogacy agreement are of questionable enforceability at the present.

Commercial surrogacy will become validated if the North Carolina Legislature passes House Bill 510 (SB 440) as presently written. The proposed law states that: “The consideration, if any, paid to a gestational carrier shall be reasonable and negotiated in good faith between the parties. Compensation may not be conditioned upon the health or characteristics of any fetus, embryo, or child produced as the result of assisted reproduction.”

In conclusion, at the present only altruistic surrogacy appears to be achievable in North Carolina through North Carolina’s adoption statutes but little protections are available to the contracting party/intended parent due to present questions surrounding the enforceability of surrogacy contracts and the legal presumptions presently in place regarding parentage. However, times-are-a-changin’ and North Carolina appears (if HB 510 and SB 440 are any indication) to be moving along the same progressive timeline as many other states and may soon make it easier to create surrogacy arrangements between intended parents and the gestational women, potentially even commercial surrogacy arrangements. It just takes a little time for the law to catch up to changes in the technology and culture.

Author’s Note: The above is presented as general information on surrogacy law in North Carolina. It is not exhaustive coverage of this issue but only a general explanation from an attorney’s perspective. The purpose of this article is to inform the non-lawyer who may read it the current status of surrogacy law in North Carolina. The reader interested in learning more should contact an attorney licensed to practice law in their jurisdiction.